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Great Moderation at the Firm Level? 





Aggregated output in industrialized countries has become less volatile over the past decades. 
Whether this “Great Moderation” can be found in firm level data as well remains disputed. 
We study the evolution of firm level output volatility using a balanced panel dataset on 
German firms that covers 35 years (1971-2005) and about 1,500 firms per year. In contrast to 
earlier work using firm level data, we use the multifactor residual model proposed by Pesaran 
(2006) to isolate the idiosyncratic component of firms’ real sales growth from macroeconomic 
developments. Our paper has three main findings. First, time trends in unconditional firm 
level and aggregated output volatility in Germany are similar. There has been a long-run 
downward trend, which was interrupted by the unification period. Second, the conditional, 
idiosyncratic firm level volatility does not exhibit a downward trend. If anything idiosyncratic 
volatility has been on a slow trend rise. Third, we find evidence of a positive link between 
growth and volatility at the firm level.  
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1  Introduction 
Aggregated output has become less volatile over the past decades in industrialized 
countries (see, among others, Blanchard and Simon 2001, Stock and Watson 2003). 
While this stylized fact is widely accepted, the causes for the “Great Moderation” are 
still the subject of lively debate. The jury is still out on the question whether “Good 
Policy”, in particular a more stabilizing monetary policy, or “Good Luck”, i.e. the 
absence of major shocks, is the main cause of the Great Moderation. (For recent 
contributions, see Benati 2007, Benati and Surico 2006, Canova 2006, or Giannone et 
al. 2007.)  
Yet, for individual households, it is the development of volatility at the firm level 
rather than the development of aggregate volatility that matters. If firm level volatility 
increases, households must find ways to diversify firm level risks and to shield their 
consumption against income fluctuation. Possibilities for diversification, in turn, depend 
on the relative importance of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic factors affecting 
volatility at the firm level. Idiosyncratic volatility can be diversified in developed 
financial markets. Macroeconomic factors, in contrast, affect all firms in a similar 
manner and can be diversified nationally only to the extent that some firms react 
differently to the same macroeconomic shock. I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  w e  t h u s  t e s t  w h e t h e r  
evidence of a Great Moderation can be found at the firm level.  
To date, there is little consensus reached how firm level output volatility has evolved 
over time, let alone the causes for changes in this volatility. For the USA, Comin and 
Philippon (2005) were the first to claim diverging patterns in firm level and aggregated 
output volatility. According to their results, firm level output volatility has increased, 
whereas aggregated output volatility has decreased (see also Comin and Mulani 2006). 
Comin et al. (2006) confirm these general patterns in the data and show that output and 
employment volatility display similar trends. Yet Davis et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
the finding of an increase in firm level output volatility crucially depends on the sample 
of firms chosen. According to their results, the increase in firm level volatility is a 
feature of large, publicly traded firms. Using information on privately-owned firms as 
well, Davis et al. (2006) find a downward trend in firm level volatility for the US, 
mirroring the macro level development. 
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Evidence on firm level volatility for non-US countries is scarce (Davis and Kahn 
2007). For France, Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show an upward trend in firm level 
volatility. For Germany, patterns at the firm level are similar to those found in 
aggregated data, and there is no evidence of an increase in volatility (Buch et al. 2006).
1  
In this paper, we go beyond earlier studies by using a comprehensive panel dataset 
for German firms. These data allow tracking individual firms for a maximum of 35 
years (1971-2005). Our data come from the Financial Statements Data Pool and the 
Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics of German firms provided by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.  
Methodologically, we depart from earlier literature in two regards. First, we use the 
multifactor residual model proposed by Pesaran (2006) to isolate the idiosyncratic 
growth of firms’ sales from macroeconomic factors. We control for observed and 
unobserved macroeconomic developments affecting all firms while allowing for a 
heterogeneous response of firms to these factors. Our results show that differences 
between the unconditional volatility of firms’ sales growth and the idiosyncratic, 
conditional volatility are quite substantial. Without distinguishing the micro- and the 
macro-component, inference about trends in firm level versus aggregate volatility might 
thus be misleading. Second, we employ fixed effects panel regressions as well as the 
heteroskedastic regression model proposed by Harvey (1976) to analyze the 
determinants of firm level growth volatility. This method has the advantage that we can 
simultaneously estimate the determinants of the mean and the variance of firms’ sales 
growth. Moreover, our results do not rely on arbitrary choices of choosing a time 
window for the computation of (rolling) volatilities.  
Why would one expect firm level and aggregated volatility to differ? After all, 
aggregate growth rates of GDP can be seen as the averaged growth rates across all firms 
in an economy. Yet, this does not automatically imply that the same trends as in the 
volatility of GDP growth can be found in firm level data. Instead, developments of 
growth volatility at the aggregate level and the firm level might differ if output changes 
are imperfectly correlated across firms (Comin and Phillipon 2005). Patterns of 
correlation, in turn, may change due to differences in the process of deregulation across 
                                                 
1   For evidence on aggregated volatility in Germany see Aßmann et al. (2006) and Buch et al. (2004). 
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sectors, differences in R&D intensities, or different degrees of goods market 
competition. Also, advancing financial markets provide better opportunities for risk-
sharing, which increases the ability of investors to take on risks. Depending on the 
degree of information asymmetries at the firm level, different firms might be affected 
differently. These arguments suggest that studying the development of aggregated 
volatility only may mask diverging trends at the firm level.  
Davis et al. (2006), in contrast, argue that differences in the time series patterns of 
firm level and aggregated volatility are unlikely. They argue that volatility at different 
level of aggregation moves into the same direction if the shares of firms in aggregated 
output and the responses of firms to macroeconomic developments remain relatively 
stable.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Part 2, we provide a brief theoretical 
background. In Parts 3 and 4, we describe our data and our empirical model. In Part 5, 
we use this model to decompose firms’ growth rates into the idiosyncratic component 
and the component driven by macroeconomic factors, and we analyze the determinants 
of firm level growth volatility. Part 6 concludes. We find that trends in firm level and 
aggregate volatility are similar when looking at the unconditional volatility at the firm 
level. This supports the view of Davis et al. (2006). Controlling for macroeconomic 
developments, we find that firm level volatility is not only lower but also exhibits no 
downward trend. In fact, there even is some evidence of a very slow increase in 
idiosyncratic firm level volatility, supporting the view of Comin and Phillipon (2005). 
We also investigate the determinants of idiosyncratic volatility and find higher asset 
growth and lower inventory-sales ratios to be associated with a higher volatility of 
firms’ sales. Leverage has no significant impact. 
2  Theoretical Background 
In order to understand how firm level and aggregate volatility develop – and why 
time trends might differ – a theoretical framework which departs from the assumption 
of symmetric, homogenous firms is required. Using a standard Dixit-Stiglitz-type 
specification of household preferences, it can be shown that firm level prices and output 
depend on firm level and macroeconomic factors alike. As shown in Woodford (2003: 
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Chapter 3), the first-order condition for the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier of 
good i is then given by: 
() ( 0 , , ; , , 1 = Π it t t t
I
t t Y P p i p ξ ξ )      (1) 
where   is the first derivative of the firm i’s profit function,  1 Π () i pt  is the price 
charged for good i, 
I
t p  is an index of the price charged in industry I to which firm i 
belongs,  t P  is the economy-wide price index,  t Y  is an index of aggregate demand,  t ξ  is 
a vector of exogenous macroeconomic disturbances, and  it ξ  is a vector of firm-specific 
disturbances. According to equation (1), a firm’s profit maximum with the 
corresponding prices and quantities depends on firm-specific, industry-specific, and 
macroeconomic developments. These variables, by definition, also have an impact on 
the volatility of firm level variables. 
Equation (1) also implies that trends in the volatility of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors might differ if  t ξ  and  it ξ  exhibit different time trends or if the 
propagation channels between micro- and macroeconomic developments change 
systematically over time. Focusing on the micro-economic determinants of firm level 
volatility, we can think of four main reasons why volatility may change over time.  
First, the process of financial market deregulation and integration may provide better 
risk-sharing possibilities for investors. Hence, ceteris paribus, more risky firms may be 
able to obtain external finance, thus raising the average risk and volatility of firms. 
Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) find evidence for France supporting the hypothesis that 
the financial market deregulation has contributed to an increase in firm level output 
volatility. We will account for the importance of financial frictions by including the 
leverage ratio of firms. 
Second, greater exposure to international competition and the deregulation of product 
markets may increase the elasticity of demand that firms are facing. This could change 
the responsiveness of firms to a given shock.
2  
                                                 
2   See Rodrik (1997) for a related argument as to why labor market volatility may increase in integrated 
markets. 
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Third, changes in the process of productivity growth away from the imitation of 
existing technologies towards innovative research and development may increase 
volatility. Eichengreen (2007), for instance, notes that, up until roughly the 1970s, 
growth in Europe was characterized by a catching up process to the technological 
frontier whereas in later decades innovative R&D started to dominate. 
Fourth, new information technologies have helped firms to improve their inventory 
management. During the “Great Moderation”, output volatility fell further than final 
sales volatility (Davis and Kahn 2007). This implies a change in the behavior of 
inventories in terms of lower volatility of inventories and/or a change in the covariance 
between inventories and sales. In our empirical analysis below, we will look at the 
volatility of real sales rather than output. From a theoretical point of view, we would 
expect inventories to be used to smoothen production when shocks to firms’ sales 
dominate (Hornstein 1998). If productivity shocks dominate, in contrast, inventories are 
used to stabilize sales. Hence, we use firm level information on the inventory-sales ratio 
to account for the fact that inventories should be adjusted counter-cyclically with regard 
to fluctuations in real sales. 
Our data are not rich enough to study the importance of all of these factors. However, 
we will show trends in the data and model the determinants of volatility as closely as 
possible to the above hypotheses. Our focus is on isolating micro factors and macro 
factors contributing to changes in firm level volatility.  
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 The Data 
To document long-run trends in firm level volatility, we exploit, for the first time, a 
new firm level dataset that links two datasets available at the Deutsche Bundesbank: the 
Corporate Balance Sheets Statistics (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik), which covers the 
period from 1971 to 1996, and the Financial Statements Data Pool 
(Jahresabschlussdatenpool), which starts in 1997. (For methodological changes, see 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2005, 2006).) Earlier research was restricted to either of these 
statistics. For example, the Corporate Balance Sheets Statistics were used to trace the 
dynamics of firms over the cycle (Döpke and Weber 2006). The Financial Statements 
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Data Pool was used to exploit the cross-section dimensions to analyze the link between 
growth and volatility at the firm level (Buch and Döpke 2007, 2008).  
The Financial Statements Data Pool replaces the Corporate Balance Sheets Statistics 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as the number of corporate annual financial statements 
being submitted to the Bundesbank declined after the launch of the European Monetary 
Union in 1999 and the subsequent discontinuation of the Bundesbank’s rediscount 
business. It has been compiled in a joint project of the Bundesbank and a number of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. The Financial Statements Data Pool 
is somewhat broader than the Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics. The firms represented 
about three-quarters of the gross value added of the non-financial business sector in 
Germany in 2003 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2005). Both data sets can be used for 
statistical purposes, but under strict confidentiality on the premises of the Bundesbank 
only. The data have been made anonymous, and only Bundesbank staff is allowed to 
work with the Financial Statements Data Pool. 
The total time series dimension of our new, linked data set covers 35 years (1971-
2005). The unit of observation is the individual firm. Generally, our dataset contains 
information on all balance sheet items and financial statements. Since we are interested 
in tracking the evolution of a large number of firms over a long time horizon, we 
retrieve information on firms’ sales, assets, the legal form, the industry, and some key 
firm level control variables only. We use the following firm level variables: 
o  (Real) sales: Like Comin and Phillipon (2005) or Davis et al. (2006), we use real 
sales as a proxy for firm level output. For this variable, we have relatively few 
data losses owing to incomplete and inconsistent reporting. Developments of sales 
and output differ in that the inventory growth and sales growth are imperfectly 
correlated. We use sales in order to avoid a possible bias arising from the fact that 
we have only balance sheet data on inventories. Lacking information on firm level 
prices, we convert nominal variables into real variables by deflating each firm’s 
sales with the industry-level price index obtained from the EU KLEMS database 
(see www.euklems.net) and taking the difference of the logarithm of real sales.  
o  Assets: Total assets of firms are used as a proxy for the size of firms. The 
advantage of this measure over size measures such as the stock of fixed assets, 
   8
equity capital, or external debt, is that it is not influenced by differences in the 
financing structure or the asset structure of firms. Also, total assets are a stock 
measure of firm size, which is likely to fluctuate less over time than sales as a 
flow measure. 
o  Inventories: We include the inventory-sales ratio to capture possible effects of 
technological changes on the volatility of firms’ sales. This also takes into account 
that sales are an imperfect proxy of output if inventories change. 
o  Leverage: We compute a measure of leverage as a firm’s debt divided by total 
equity. Leverage could be one measure of credit market friction. From a 
theoretical point of view, we expect that more severe financial friction reduce 
growth and increase the volatility of investment (Aghion and Banerjee 2005). 
Accordingly, the expected sign of leverage would be negative.
3  
Our dataset contains information on about 80,000 firms per year for the 1971-2005 
period. The unrestricted dataset has 2.8 million firm-year observations. The average 
duration in the panel is about 13 years per firm. Since our empirical method, which will 
be explained in more detail below, is partly based on time series regressions for each 
individual firm, we retain only those firms which are present in the dataset for the full 
period. This reduces the total number of firms contained in the sample to 1,464 firms or 
56,807 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 gives the distribution of the unrestricted sample (i.e. the unbalanced panel) 
by the number of firms and the volume of real sales by industry (Table 1a) and years 
(Table 1b). We also provide comparative evidence of the balanced panel.  
--- Insert Table 1 about here. --- 
One particularly interesting feature of our dataset is that it contains information on 
manufacturing and services firms. In terms of the volume of sales, services account for 
roughly 19% of sales in the balanced panel. The bulk of these sales (13%) is in the 
wholesale trade sector. In the unbalanced panel, the largest sector is wholesale trade as 
well, accounting for about 24% of total in terms of sales. The share of the wholesale 
                                                 
3   Note that information on leverage is not available for a number of firms, which reduces the size of our 
sample from about 1,750 to 1,450 firms. However, the qualitative results that are reported in the 
following also hold for the larger panel. 
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trade sector is even higher in terms of the number of firms (21% in the unbalanced 
panel and 29% in the balanced panel). These numbers are out of proportion to the 
importance of this sector for GDP since we refer to sales rather than to value added. 
None of the remaining sectors dominates as clearly. As regards the number of firms, the 
basic metals sector (11.6%) ranks second, and machinery and equipment (10.7%) ranks 
third. In terms of the volume of real sales, the largest sector is petroleum products 
(29.6%), followed by transport equipment (15.7%), and wholesale trade (12.7%).  
A comparison of the structure of the balanced panel and the unbalanced panel shows 
that firms from manufacturing sectors are overrepresented and services firms are 
underrepresented in the balanced panel. This is not surprising since the balanced panel 
favors firms which had taken part in the Bundesbank’s rediscount business. At the same 
time, this makes our findings robust to structural changes (see, e.g., Parker 2007). The 
disadvantage, of course, is that the inflow of younger and presumably riskier firms into 
the sample as well as the exit of high volatility firms is not captured. In Section 5.3 
below, we discuss different sample splits, which take into account that the survivorship 
bias might differ across firms of different sectors, size, or legal status. Table 1b shows 
the allocation of firms over the years. Here, the selection bias due to our restriction on a 
balanced panel is less severe, as we have about 3% of all observations in each year in 
both samples. 
3.2 Computing Firm Level Volatility  











g      (2) 
where  it g  is firm i’s sales growth rate, and  it y  are firm i’s real sales in t. Since our 
data contain no information on reasons for large outliers such as mergers and 
acquisitions, we drop observations which fall by more than half or more than double. 
Table 2a shows the descriptive statistics. The mean firm level growth rate for the full 
sample is 3.6%, which is slightly higher than the growth rate of real GDP (2.2%).  
--- Insert Table 2 about here. --- 
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As regards the measurement of volatility, it has become relatively standard in the 
literature to compute growth volatility as the standard deviation in growth rates over a 
moving 5-year or 10-year window (see, e.g., Comin and Phillipon 2006, Davis et al. 
2006). The volatility of real sales over a 10-year window is thus defined as: 
() ()

















τ σ it t i it g g y      (3). 
where   it g  measures the mean growth rate. Correspondingly, the volatility over a 5-
year window  () y it
5 σ  uses observations ranging from t = -4 to t = 0. 
Graph 1 plots the mean, unconditional firm level volatility of sales growth against 
the volatility of the growth rate of GDP. The unconditional volatility has not been 
corrected for macroeconomic influences. The median standard deviation of firm level 
growth is about 12%, which is comparable to evidence found in earlier studies (Buch et 
al. 2006, Comin and Phillipon 2005) and 10 times higher than the volatility of 
aggregated GDP. Graph 1 shows that the time trends are quite similar and share two 
main features. First, there has been a trend decline in volatility over time. Second, 
volatility was temporarily higher in the period following German unification in the early 
1990s. These general patterns in the data are very similar when using the unbalanced 
panel of firms. 
--- Insert Graph 1 about here. --- 
The information in Graph 1 alone, however, says little about time trends in the 
idiosyncratic volatility of firms’ growth volatility though. We will therefore describe the 
methodology, in the following, how we isolate microeconomic factors from 
macroeconomic factors affecting firm level volatility. 
4  Computing Idiosyncratic Firm Level Volatility 
Previous empirical work on the determinants of firm level volatility uses the 
volatility of output as given by equation (3) as the dependent variable. Such regressions 
suffer from three potential problems. First, by construction, the dependent variable is 
serially correlated. Second, the choice of the 5-year or 10-year window for the 
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computation of volatility is somewhat arbitrary, although it is often used in the 
empirical literature. Third, using the unconditional firm level volatility does not allow 
distinguishing idiosyncratic, firm level, from macroeconomic factors. The parallel 
evolution of firm level and aggregated volatility documented in Graph 1 could be the 
result of similar developments at different levels of aggregation, but it could also cloud 
diverging patterns at the firm level. Simply including observable macroeconomic 
volatilities as regressors may not fully isolate the idiosyncratic component because only 
observed factors are included. Also, in a pooled regression, the impact of 
macroeconomic factors is assumed to be homogenous across firms.  
Hence, in this section, we describe the multifactor residual model recently proposed 
by Pesaran (2006). This model allows us to filter observed and unobserved 
macroeconomic factors out of the firm level data. It provides us with a measure of the 
conditional, idiosyncratic firm level real sales growth. To see the logic of the 
multifactor residual model, assume that firm level sales growth is given by  
it it i t i it x d g ε β α + + = ' '      (4)   
where  N i ,..., 2 , 1 =  is the number of firms  and  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =  the number of years. 
α and  β  are parameters to be estimated. Equation (4) states that firm level growth 
depends on a  1 × k  vector of observable macroeconomic factors ( t d ) and a vector of 
observed firm-specific regressors ( it x ). The errors are assumed to have a multifactor 
structure: 
it t i it u f + = ' γ ε        ( 5 )    
where  t f  is an  1 × m  vector of unobserved macroeconomic factors and  it u  the 
individual-specific (idiosyncratic) errors, which are assumed to be distributed 
independently of  t d  and  it x . In Pesaran (2006), the observed and unobserved factors  t d  
and  t f  are assumed to be covariance stationary. Generally, the unobserved factors can 
be correlated with ( t d , it x ); the individual-specific regressors are modelled according 
to: 
it t i t i it v f d A x + Γ + = ' '      (6) 
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where  i A  and  i Γ  are factor loading matrices and  it v  those components of  it x  which 
are independent of the macroeconomic factors.  
In most applications, the interest is in the slope coefficients  i β  in equation (4). The 
factor loadings  i α  and  i γ  are not the main interest, but they can be estimated 
consistently when both N and T are large. Since our panel has a time series dimension of 
T = 35, we can analyze the firm level responses to the macroeconomic factors. 
However, our main interest is in the variance of the idiosyncratic term  it u . With an 
estimate of  it u  at hand, we can compute the variance of the idiosyncratic component of 
firm level growth for each firm i. This variance can be proxied through the variance of 






















(See e.g. Gorbachev (2007) for a similar specification using household consumption 
data.) 
The key challenge is to isolate developments at the firm level from aggregate 
developments while taking into account the fact that some of the macroeconomic 
factors affecting all firms alike are unobserved. Hence, we isolate factors which affect 
all firms ( t d , t f ) from those firm-specific variables, which are independent from the 
macroeconomic factors, i.e. the residual of equation (6) ( it v ). We perform this 
decomposition in two steps. 
In a first step, we run time-series regressions for sales growth of each firm in the 
sample on observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors. Following Pesaran (2006), 
the unobserved macroeconomic factors can be proxied through the sample means of 
firm-specific variables. We therefore take advantage of the fact that the model described 
by equations (4)-(6) is quite general as it allows the unobserved common factors  t f  to 
be correlated with the individual-specific regressors  it x  via a multifactor structure with 
heterogeneous factor loadings over the cross-section units. We run these regressions for 
each of the firms in our balanced panel and for each of the firm level variables 
separately and retain the residuals from these regressions. The individual-specific 
coefficients are asymptotically unbiased as  ∞ → N  for both T fixed and  ∞ → T  as long 
as the rank condition concerning the factor loadings is satisfied (Pesaran 2006). 
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In a second step, we use the squared residuals from these time series regressions, 
which are the growth rates of firm level variables cleaned of the observed and 
unobserved factors, in a pooled firm level panel regression: 
it l s t i it it v u η δ α δ α δ α δ α α α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0
2 ' ' ' ' '    (7) 




l s t i δ δ δ δ , , ,  are firm-, time-, secto
an
 firm level growth rates, we also use graphical as well as regression-based 
 
Results for the unconditional volatility of firm level sales growth reported in Graph 1 
 resembles the drop 
r-, and legal fixed effects, 
d   it v  is a set of firm-specific regressors, i.e. the first-stage residuals from equation 
(6). We use time fixed effects as a general specification of the time trend as well as a 
linear time trend. Note that the time trend also captures the fact that firm level volatility 
is related to firm age. Typically, older and more established firms are less volatile than 
younger firms. Taken in isolation, this should lead to a negative impact of the time trend 
on volatility but, of course, the trend also captures other factors that vary systematically 
over time. 
To check whether there is a time trend in the variance of the idiosyncratic, 
conditional
evidence. We employ equation (3) above and compute the rolling standard deviation of 
the idiosyncratic volatility. In addition, we use fixed effects panel regressions and the 
heteroskedastic regression model suggested by Harvey (1976) to check whether the 
squared residuals as a proxy for the idiosyncratic volatility of firm level sales growth 
follow a systematic process. Note that the first-stage regressions account for the 
observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors in the mean growth of firm level 
sales. This does not preclude finding that macroeconomic factors and time trends to 
have an impact on the idiosyncratic variance of firm level growth. 
5  Decomposing and Explaining Firm Level Volatility
provide evidence of a decline in firm level volatility, which largely
in macroeconomic volatility. To what extent does this decline in firm level volatility 
result from lower volatility at the macro-level and to what extent does it reflect smaller 
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idiosyncratic volatility? In this section, we report the results of the first- and second-
stage regressions described above. 
5.1 First-Stage Regression: Decomposing Firm Level Volatility 
The goal of the first-stage regressions is to clean the growth of firm level variables of 
served macroeconomic 
fac
1.8%), world import volume (4.0%), raw material prices (6.7%), and the 
rea
We use four means of firm-specific variables as proxies for unobserved 
macroeconomic factors. The   captures structural shifts 
in 
w 0.9, and most are below 0.5. We find the 
observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors. Our set of ob
tors includes domestic and foreign as well as price and quantity measures. To capture 
the domestic macroeconomic environment, we include the growth rate of domestic 
absorption, short-term interest rates, and domestic inflation. To capture the international 
macroeconomic environment, we include the annual changes in the real exchange rate, 
world demand, and raw material prices. (Details on the data definitions are given in the 
Appendix.) 
Table 2 reports the growth rate of other macroeconomic factors, i.e. domestic real 
absorption (
l effective exchange rate of the German economy against its 23 most important 
trading partners (-0.1%). An increase in this indicator implies a real appreciation. The 
average short-term interest rate and the inflation rate over this period were 5.7% and 
2.7%, respectively. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here. --- 
mean growth rate of firms’ sales
firm level growth. The growth rate of firms’ assets captures changes in the size 
structure of firms. The mean inventory-sales ratio captures changes in the importance of 
inventories due to technological progress, and mean leverage across firms captures 
changing financial frictions. As expected, the inventory-sales ratio shows a downward 
trend over time, reflecting improvements in inventory management. Leverage, in 
contrast, has been increasing up until the early 1990s and falling thereafter, reflecting 
legislative changes affecting the financing of firms in Germany as well as the increase 
in stock market valuation during the 1990s. 
Table 2b shows the correlations between the observed macro-factors and the 
unobserved factors. All correlations are belo
   15
hig
me time, results of these 
reg
orted in Table 3a show some 
dif
To assess the importance of the macroeconomic factors for firm level sales growth, 
we also compute the partia pute the partial R²s by 
regressing firm level sales growth on all macroeconomic factors, excluding one, and by 
hest correlations between GDP growth and the growth rate of domestic absorption as 
well as between some firm level variables. Since domestic absorption is less correlated 
with the mean firm level factors than GDP growth, we use domestic absorption as our 
domestic demand component. In addition, the changes in the real exchange rate and in 
world imports as well as the interest rate and inflation show relatively high pairwise 
correlations. The same holds for the mean firm level variables. However, we include a 
full set of observed and unobserved macro-factors as these may still pick up some 
orthogonal component of the macroeconomic environment.  
The advantage of running the first-stage regressions firm-by-firm is that we allow for 
the largest possible heterogeneity across firms. At the sa
ressions are difficult to visualize. Therefore, we run simple cross-section regressions 
of the firm level responses to the macro-environment on a set of dummy variables. To 
account for the fact that the coefficients are measured with uncertainty, we weight these 
observations with the inverse of their standard deviation.  
The aim of this exercise is to see whether, for instance, large and small firms react 
differently to the macroeconomic environment. Results rep
ferences in the response of firms to macroeconomic factors. Generally, larger firms 
grow faster than smaller firms when domestic and world market demand increases and 
the real exchange rate appreciates. Also, an increase in raw materials prices and in the 
real interest rate increases the growth of large firms relative to that of small firms. This 
would be consistent with large firms being oriented more towards the international 
market and less affected by financial constraints. Listed firms, in contrast, do not differ 
significantly from the rest of the sample. An increase in the real interest rate lowers 
growth of firms in the sectors manufacturing, services, and construction in comparison 
to growth in the remaining sectors (agriculture, mining, energy). Higher world import 
demand increases growth in the manufacturing and construction sector, while higher 
raw materials prices lower growth in manufacturing and services. 
--- Insert Table 3 about here. --- 
l R²s for these factors. We com
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 rolling window. There are two striking 
ob
is lower than the unconditional volatility. 
During the turbulent 1970s, in particular, macroeconomic factors accounted for more 
than 50% of the volatility  subsequent periods, the 
ressing the excluded factor on the remaining macroeconomic factors. Then, we 
regress the residual of the sales equation on the residual of the equation explaining the 
excluded factor, and we retain the R². This R² indicates how much a particular 
macroeconomic factor contributes to explaining the variance of firm level sales growth.  
On average, the macroeconomic factors individually explain about 5-6% of the 
variance in sales growth across firms (Table 2c). However, the explanatory power 
varies widely with the highest partial R²s being in the range of 0.45 for domestic 
sorption and 0.59 for the real exchange rate. Hence, for some of the firms in the 
sample, individual macroeconomic factors explain more than 50% of the variance in 
real sales over time.  
Table 3b reports results of regressing the partial R²s on a set of dummy variables. 
Inflation has an above average explanatory power for large firms and for firms in 
manufacturing, servic
ove average explanatory power for manufacturing and services firms. Also, the 
construction sector differs from the rest of the sample in the sense that most 
macroeconomic factors (domestic absorption, the real exchange rate, and nominal 
interest rates) have a below-average explanatory power for firms from this sector. 
Generally, the exact specification of the first-stage regressions should not be 
overemphasized. Essentially, these regressions serve the purpose of filtering 
macroeconomic information out of the firm level time series and to retai
osyncratic component of sales growth. In this sense, they are similar to the mean 
equations in an ARCH or GARCH setting, which serve the purpose of providing an 
estimate of the variance of the variable at hand. 
The plots of the residual standard deviations are perhaps the most interesting 
outcome of these first-stage regressions. Graph 2 shows the conditional volatility of 
firms’ sales growth. As before, we use a 5-year
servations that immediately meet the eye.  
--- Insert Graph 2 about here. --- 
First, the conditional firm level volatility 
of firm level sales growth. In 
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im
n shows a slight upward trend. In this sense, 
 firm 
level? Do size and sector effects matter? Do we find support for different hypothesis as 
tions we will 
no
of sales as a dependent variable (cf. equation (7)). We use fixed-effects 
pa
 the variation in the volatility of sales 
growth across firms. In similar (unreported) regressions using the growth rate of firms’ 
sales as a dependent variab from 0.13 to 0.19. It does 
no
portance of macroeconomic factors has been less pronounced, but the gap between 
the conditional and the unconditional volatility series was still substantial. Hence, even 
though the impact of individual macroeconomic factors on firm level sales growth has, 
on average, been small, the overall impact of the macro-economy on firm level 
developments has been quite substantial. 
Second, the downward trend in firm level volatility reported in Graph 1 is not visible 
once macroeconomic factors are taken into consideration. Instead, the time profile of 
firm level volatility is rather flat and eve
our results confirm the conclusion reached by Davis et al. (2006) that (unconditional) 
firm level and aggregate volatility can be expected to behave similarly. However, our 
findings for the conditional volatility are also consistent with Comin and Phillipon 
(2006) who argue that the time trends of aggregate and firm level volatility differ. 
5.2  Second-Stage Regressions: Explaining the Volatility of Sales Growth 
Which are the firm-specific factors that determine the volatility of growth at the
to the causes of the Great Moderation at the firm level? These are ques
w turn to. 
In Table 4, we report results of firm level regressions using the squared residuals of 
the first-stage regressions as a measure of the volatility of the conditional firm level 
growth rates 
nel regressions with robust standard errors. In contrast to the first-stage regressions, 
we now estimate homogenous coefficients.  
--- Insert Table 4 about here. --- 
Generally, our model explains less than 5% of
le, we obtain higher R²s ranging 
t come as a surprise to find that the explanatory power of the idiosyncratic, firm level 
volatility is relatively low, since we have stripped the variables off macroeconomic 
developments and since we consider only the idiosyncratic variation in the data. 
Moreover, these results are strongly driven by the very large amount of cross-sectional 
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heterogeneity, which is typical for large micro-data sets like the one at hand. 
(Gorbachev (2007), for instance, analyzes the determinants of household-level 
consumption risk for the US and reports R²s in a similar range.) 
We find a very consistent pattern of sales volatility to be positively related to growth 
of total assets. The estimated coefficient is about 0.03, and it is quite robust across 
different specifications with regard to other control variables and the inclusion of fixed 
eff




ects. Moreover, the impact of asset growth on firm level volatility builds up gradually 
over time. We include up to three lags of asset growth, and the first lag is significant 
throughout. In terms of economic significance, asset growth is the most important 
variable, with a beta coefficient of 8%. Hence, variation in sales growth across firms 
accounts for about 8% in the variation of volatility across firms. 
The finding that faster-growing firms also have more volatile sales growth is 
consistent with earlier findings at the firm level or industry level concerning the growth-
volatility nexus. It is at odds with some findings for a negativ
wth and volatility using aggregated data. However, it would not come as a surprise 
to find that the growth rates of firms are imperfectly correlated. Imbs (2007), for 
example, shows that the correlation between growth and volatility depends on the level 
of aggregation of the data. He finds a positive correlation between growth and volatility 
at the industry level. One explanation is that growth rates are imperfectly correlated 
across sectors. Our firm level data suggest a similar positive relationship. 
Firms with a high inventory-sales ratio have a low volatility of real sales. The beta 
coefficient is –1.3%. Leverage as a measure of the financial constraints that firms are 
facing is insignificant, in contrast. At first sight, the negative coefficient 
ms at odds with the hypothesis that improved inventory management helps firms to 
reduce the volatility of sales. According to this explanation, technological innovations 
help firms to reduce the desired inventory-sales ratio. A lower inventory-sales ratio, in 
turn, would weaken the destabilizing, pro-cyclical impact that inventories have for final 
sales via a positive covariance between inventories and sales (Ramey and Vine 2004). 
Our results would be consistent though with inventories serving as a buffer against 
productivity shocks. According to this interpretation, higher inventory-sales ratios 
would smoothen the impact of volatile production on sales. 
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Generally, however, standard models of inventory management often fail to find 
support in the macro-data. Prominent theories such as the production smoothing model 
(Holt et al. 1960) predict a negative correlation between inventory investment and 
ov
roeconomic factors have 
filt
lso interact the time trend with a dummy variable for 
ultaneously model the 
ic sales growth, and we correct for the bias arising 
fro
e included. This 
erall production, which was not found in the data. (See Blinder (1986) and the 
literature cited therein.) Rather, most macro studies find a positive correlation between 
inventory investment and GDP. Possible explanations of these findings point, inter alia, 
to the fact that inventories are still treated at a too aggregated level. In particular, a 
distinction between inventories of inputs and the inventories of finished goods is 
warranted. However, we lack such information in our dataset.  
To test whether there are time trends in firm level volatility, we include a time trend 
and a unification dummy. The unification dummy and the time trend are insignificant if 
lagged dynamics are accounted for. This shows that our mac
ered out impacts of the unification process on firm level volatility. The time trend is 
significant but relatively small, thus indicating only a relatively slow decline of 
volatility. Moreover, the beta coefficient is only 0.26%. In contrast to unconditional 
firm level volatility and aggregated volatility, the idiosyncratic volatility of firms has 
thus been on a slow trend rise.  
In unreported regressions, we include a full set of time-fixed effects as a more 
flexible way to capture time trends in the data. Results for the remaining control 
variables are unchanged. We a
listed firms to test the hypothesis put forward by Davis et al. (2006) that firm level 
volatility has increased because of an upward trend in the volatility of large, publicly 
listed firms. However, this interaction term is insignificant. 
5.3 Robustness and Selection Issues 
To check the robustness of our results, we split the sample along different 
dimensions, we use a heteroskedastic regression model to sim
mean and the variance of idiosyncrat
m the fact that we estimate our model on a reduced sample of firms. 
Sample splits: The descriptive statistics reported in Tables 1a and 1b show 
differences between the full and the reduced sample. Hence, sample selection may 
affect our results since only firms which have data for the full sample ar






ple selection could affect our results if the residuals from the regression of the 
determinants of firm level output volatility were correlated with residuals from a latent 
regression determining the survival of firms. These survival probabilities, in turn, may 
be related to firm size, the sector in which firms are active, or access to the capital 
market. To account for such differences, we split the sample into manufacturing and 
services, listed and unlisted, and small and large firms (Table 4a). The cut-off for small 
and large firms is the median level of real sales. To test whether time trends in firm 
level volatility have changed over time, we break down the sample further into the 
1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, and the current decade (Table 4b). We also split the sample 
in 1985, the year which is often taken as the start of the Great Moderation period.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that the qualitative results for the control 
variables are generally not affected by the different sample compositions. There are a 
few exceptions though. In the 1970s, none of our control variables is signif
tead, there has been a positive and significant upward time trend in firm level 
volatility. Moreover, the inventory-sales ratio is insignificant for the sub-samples of 
listed firms (although the negative sign is retained). Inventories have a negative and 
significant effect for services firms, which would seem surprising for services which are 
non-storable. However, since the sector “services” also includes retail and wholesale 
trade firms and since these firms carry inventories, this effect seems quite plausible. 
Selection bias: In unreported regressions, we have also estimated the volatility 
regression applying the correction for sample selection proposed by Heckman (1976). 
The selection equation shows that large firms, firms with lower sales growth, and fi
th lower leverage are more likely to be in the balanced panel. The Mills ratio is 
significant, indicating that sample selection is indeed an issue. Results for the equation 
explaining the volatility of firm level output show very similar results with regard to the 
coefficient estimates and significance as regressions not accounting for the selection 
bias. More specifically, firms that grow faster, that have a higher inventory sales ratio, 
and that have lower leverage have a lower volatility. The linear time trend is again 
positive and significant. 
Heteroskedastic regression model: To check the robustness of our results for the 
variance equation, we alternatively use a regression model with multiplicative 
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he
ations use it to model 
he
s a function of a set of explanatory variables X: 
teroskedasticity as proposed by Harvey (1976). The advantage of this model is that 
we can simultaneously specify a “mean” equation – explaining the growth of sales – as 
well as a “variance” equation – explaining the residual variance.  
The heteroskedastic regression model has, to the best of our knowledge, not been 
applied to an analysis of firm level volatility so far. Earlier applic
teroskedasticity in the residuals, yet most papers do not focus on estimates of the 
variance equation. There are two exceptions. A recent paper by Cerqueiro et al. (2007) 
studies banks’ loan pricing decisions. Ang and Peterson (1985) estimate a capital asset 
pricing model and study the determinants of rates of returns as well as the variance of 
returns. 
The mean equation of the heteroskedastic regression model gives the level of sales 
growth a it it it x g ε β + = ' ~ ~  where  it ε  is 
the residual with  [] 0 ~ | = it it x E ε  and  [ ] { } φ σ ε it it it Z x VAR ' exp ij
~ |
2 = =  . The variance 
equation is given by  φ σ it it Z'
2 = . The coefficients β  and φ can be obtained by 
maximizing the log-likelihood function. One advantage of this methodology is that the 
 asset growth is positively correlated with the growth rate of firm level sales. 
Th
The results for the variance equation by and large confirm the findings reported 
above considering the positiv nd the positive impact of 
parameters of the mean and of the variance equation are uncorrelated. We essentially 
estimate the same model as before but we now include dummies for the different types 
of firms (large versus small, listed versus unlisted) in lieu of a full set of firm fixed 
effects. 
Results are reported in Table 5. Turning to the results of the mean equation first, we 
find that
ere is evidence that larger firms grow faster than average. Large inventory-sales 
ratios are associated with lower sales growth, indicating that inventories contain mainly 
finished products. Since the specification of the mean equation is certainly a bit ad hoc, 
we also use a specification using a linear time trend and the unification dummy only.  
--- Insert Table 5 about here. --- 
e impact of higher asset growth a
the time trend. The firm size dummy is negative and significant. The negative impact of 
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the inventory-sales ratio is significant only in the specification using a very lean 
specification of the mean equation (Column 2 of Table 5).  
6  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has tested whether evidence of a “Great Moderation” can be found in firm 
lev
 level volatility and aggregate volatility have developed 
qu
at inference about the evolution of firm level volatility requires 
us 
terminants of the idiosyncratic 
co
ronment for firm 
lev
el data of German firms. To answer this question, we have used a unique firm level 
dataset which allows a large sample of German firms to be tracked across 35 years. Our 
paper has three main findings. 
First, the unconditional firm
ite similarly. This confirms Davis et al. (2006) who use US data and differs from the 
findings of Comin and Phillipon (2005) who find diverging trends of firm level and 
aggregated volatility.  
Second, we show th
to take account of macroeconomic factors. Using the multifactor panel model 
proposed by Pesaran (2006), we have decomposed firm level sales growth and volatility 
into the idiosyncratic component and the component driven by observed and 
unobserved macroeconomic developments. Results from this disaggregation show that 
the overall time trends in unconditional firm level volatility are driven by 
macroeconomic factors. Once we take this into account and extract the idiosyncratic 
component of firm level volatility, we not only find volatility to be lower but also to 
exhibit a flat and, if anything, slightly increasing pattern. 
Third, we use different panel models to analyze the de
mponent of firm level volatility. Faster-growing firms also exhibit a higher volatility 
of real sales growth. In this sense, higher idiosyncratic volatility could have a positive 
impact on overall growth and thus economic welfare. If anything, the time trend in firm 
level volatility has been positive. However, the time trend explains only a very small 
share of the variation in idiosyncratic volatility across firms and time. 
Our results show the importance of a stable macroeconomic envi
el stability. High macroeconomic volatility such as was observed during the 1970s 
has roughly doubled firm level volatility. In later periods, the decline in firm level 
volatility was driven largely by the decline in macroeconomic volatility. To the extent 
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that “Good Policy” is behind the decline in aggregate volatility, this has also contributed 
to lower volatility at the firm level. Idiosyncratic, firm level volatility exhibits no 
particular time trend. Studying whether similar patterns can be found in other indicators 
such as the volatility employment, income, and consumption, remains an important 
topic for future research.  
Finally, our paper has implications for the potential to diversify risks across German 
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8  Data Appendix 
 
Firm Level Data  
All firm level data are taken from the Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics and the 
Financial Statements Data Pool provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2005). The data are confidential firm level data, and the Financial 
Statements Data Pool can be used by the staff of the Deutsche Bundesbank only.  
Asset growth: Annual growth of firm’s total assets. 
Inventory-sales-ratio: Ratio of a firm’s inventory over total sales. 
Large/small firms: Firms with real sales above (below) the sample median. 
Leverage: Ratio of a firm’s total debt to total equity. 
Listed/unlisted firms: Incorporated (not incorporated) companies (Aktiengesellschaften). 
Manufacturing firms: Chemicals, Basic metals, Machinery, Transport equipment, 
Electrical equipment, Wood, Pulp and paper, Textiles, Food, Computers, Non-metallic 
mineral products, Plastic products, Petroleum products, Furniture. 
Services firms: Wholesale trade, Hotels, Transport & communication, Financial 
intermediation, Real estate, Public services, Retail trade, Firm-related services. 
 
 
Macroeconomic Data and Sources 
GDP growth (%): Annual growth rate of German real GDP (German Federal Statistical 
Office). 
Growth rate of domestic absorption (%): Annual growth rate of German real absorption 
(German Federal Statistical Office). 
Growth rate of world imports (%): Annual growth of world import volumes 
(International Monetary Fund). 
Change in real exchange rate (%): Annual growth of Germany”s real effective exchange 
rate against 23 countries in quantity notation. An increase indicates a real appreciation 
(European Central Bank). 
Change in raw material prices (%): Annual growth rate of the HWWA index of raw 
material prices (overall index). 
Short-term interest rate (%): Average short-term interest rate (3 months, Frankfurt 
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Table 1: Distribution of Firms by Sector and Year   
This table gives the distribution of firms in the sample by sector (Table 1a) and year (Table 1b). We 
report the distribution of the number of firms and of the volume of real sales (in million euro). The 
balanced panel includes all firms; the unbalanced panel includes only firms which are in the sample for 
the full period. 
Table 1a: Distribution of Firms by Sector 
  Number of firms  Real sales 
 Unbalanced  Balanced  Unbalanced  Balanced 
  Number  Percent  Number  Percent  Mil. euro  Percent  Mil. euro  Percent 
Agriculture 75,905  2.66  70  0.14  136.96  0.2  5.21  0.04 
Basic Metals  162,012  5.67  5,922  11.56  3715.76  5.5  554.64  4.72 
Chemicals  32,498 1.14  2,119 4.14  3007.83 4.45 709.93 6.04 
Computers  4,315 0.15  24 0.05 467.71 0.69  7.72 0.07 
Construction  256,831 8.99  1,710 3.34  2257.61 3.34 176.54  1.5 
Electrical  equipment  84,587 2.96  1,995 3.89  3339.02 4.94 530.11 4.51 
Energy  17,316 0.61  997 1.95  2805.73 4.15 389.37 3.31 
Financial intermediation  2,037  0.07  n.a.  n.a.  79.72  0.12  n.a.  n.a. 
Firm related services  141,704  4.96  126  0.25  1171.98  1.73  2.71  0.02 
Food  90,483 3.17  2,993 5.84  3416.93 5.06 307.85 2.62 
Furniture  28,801 1.01  633 1.24 306.31 0.45  20.42 0.17 
Hotels 19,952  0.7  n.a. n.a. 84.67 0.13  0.00  n.a. 
Machinery 152,390  5.34  5,498  10.73  3846.20  5.69  473.37  4.03 
Mining  23,341 0.82  443 0.86 826.85 1.22 267.23 2.27 
Non-metallic  
mineral  products  48,739 1.71  1,712 3.34 783.03 1.16 147.25 1.25 
Petroleum products  1,728  0.06  209  0.41  6217.74  9.2  3479.59  29.6 
Plastic products  56,767  1.99  1,312  2.56  1080.94  1.6  186.90  1.59 
Public  services  64,973 2.27  62 0.12 837.19 1.24  15.74 0.13 
Pulp and paper  72,340  2.53  1,844  3.6  1406.65  2.08  154.83  1.32 
Real  estate  184,257 6.45  137 0.27  1187.24 1.76  4.69 0.04 
Retail trade  432,062  15.13  2,872  5.6  5688.73  8.42  571.69  4.86 
Textiles  92,461 3.24  3,238 6.32  1174.39 1.74 133.50 1.14 
Transport  
& communication  107,160 3.75  458 0.89  2302.19 3.41 239.76 2.04 
Transport  equipment  22,795  0.8  862 1.68  4733.33 7.01  1848.69  15.73 
Wholesale  trade  590,360 20.67  14,965 29.21  16031.16 23.73 1498.17 12.74 
Wood  78,183 2.74  1,019 1.99 656.98 0.97  30.29 0.26 
Unallocated  12,009  0.42  20  0.04       
Total  2,856,006 100  51,240 100  67562.86 100  11756.18 100 
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Table 1b: Distribution of Firms by Year 
  Number of firms  Real sales 
 Unbalanced  Balanced  Unbalanced  Balanced 
Year Number  Percent  Number  Percent  Mil. euro  Percent  Mil. euro  Percent 
1971  47,081  1.65  1,464 2.86 1126.02 1.67  237.63 2.02 
1972  47,649  1.67  1,464 2.86 1211.66 1.79  274.21 2.33 
1973  47,983  1.68  1,464 2.86 1235.05 1.83  236.49 2.01 
1974  50,057  1.75  1,464 2.86 1338.98 1.98  251.58 2.14 
1975  61,034  2.14  1,464 2.86 1389.46 2.06  275.13 2.34 
1976  70,758  2.48  1,464 2.86 1547.38 2.29  297.35 2.53 
1977  78,006  2.73  1,464 2.86 1643.88 2.43  345.54 2.94 
1978  84,658  2.96  1,464 2.86 1588.63 2.35  302.41 2.57 
1979  87,734  3.07  1,464 2.86 1694.85 2.51  313.94 2.67 
1980  83,461  2.92  1,464 2.86 1714.93 2.54  313.84 2.67 
1981  77,945  2.73  1,464 2.86 1809.99 2.68  347.65 2.96 
1982  78,270  2.74  1,464 2.86 1783.21 2.64  357.54 3.04 
1983  79,905 2.8  1,464 2.86 1775.05 2.63  350.66 2.98 
1984  80,632  2.82  1,464 2.86 1859.23 2.75  379.22 3.23 
1985  79,846 2.8  1,464 2.86 1866.91 2.76  378.69 3.22 
1986  79,273  2.78  1,464 2.86 1707.83 2.53  328.64  2.8 
1987  78,328  2.74  1,464 2.86 1819.53 2.69  423.13  3.6 
1988  76,000  2.66  1,464 2.86 1861.77 2.76  408.70 3.48 
1989  73,296  2.57  1,464 2.86 1947.44 2.88  467.55 3.98 
1990  71,734  2.51  1,464 2.86 2032.62 3.01  480.62 4.09 
1991  72,123  2.53  1,464 2.86 2112.71 3.13  461.08 3.92 
1992  71,819  2.51  1,464 2.86 1862.75 2.76  324.80 2.76 
1993  71,246  2.49  1,464 2.86 1715.33 2.54  283.22 2.41 
1994  71,651  2.51  1,464 2.86 1839.71 2.72  283.91 2.41 
1995  68,442 2.4  1,464 2.86 1887.40 2.79  278.82 2.37 
1996  66,430  2.33  1,464 2.86 1789.63 2.65  229.48 1.95 
1997  104,157  3.65  1,464 2.86 2329.22 3.45  333.35 2.84 
1998  97,194 3.4  1,464 2.86 2154.85 3.19  288.02 2.45 
1999 98,674 3.45 1,464  2.86  2297.06  3.4  301.90  2.57 
2000  100,916  3.53  1,464 2.86 2605.32 3.86  333.83 2.84 
2001  106,080  3.71  1,464 2.86 2761.53 4.09  345.94 2.94 
2002  111,348 3.9  1,464 2.86 2699.09 3.99  338.89 2.88 
2003  123,129  4.31  1,464 2.86 2735.96 4.05  351.22 2.99 
2004  134,397  4.71  1,464 2.86 2850.51 4.22  406.53 3.46 
2005  124,750  4.37  1,464 2.86 2967.38 4.39  424.69 3.61 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the data used in the regressions.  
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  dev.  Min  Max 
GDP growth  49,183  0.022  0.017  -0.009  0.052 
Growth rate of domestic absorption  49,183  0.019  0.021  -0.022  0.052 
Growth rate of world imports  49,183  0.040  0.113  -0.211  0.305 
Change in real exchange rate  49,183  -0.001  0.048  -0.099  0.113 
Change in raw material prices  49,183  0.067  0.239  -0.474  0.943 
Short-term interest rate  49,183  0.057  0.027  0.021  0.121 
Inflation 49,183  0.028  0.019  -0.007  0.073 
Mean firm level growth real sales  49,183  0.036  0.043  -0.067  0.157 
Mean firm level growth of assets  49,183  0.037  0.037  -0.045  0.107 
Mean inventory-sales ratio  49,183  0.162  0.007  0.147  0.173 
Mean leverage  49,183  6.835  0.866  5.365  8.428 
Growth rate of firm level real sales  49,183  0.036  0.162  -0.498  1.950 
Growth rate of firm level assets  49,183  0.037  0.172  -0.499  1.892 
Inventory-sales ratio  49,183  0.162  0.147  0.000  7.970 
Leverage 49,183  6.836  9.663  -0.052  99.931 
Residual growth firm level real sales  49,183  0.000  0.121  -0.763  1.566 
Residual growth firm level assets  49,183  0.000  0.134  -0.836  1.612 
Residual inventory-sales ratio  49,183  0.000  0.053  -1.327  3.109 
Residual leverage  49,183  0.000  4.074  -44.065  66.140 
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GDP  growth    1.00            
Growth rate of 
domestic 
absorption    0.8431  1.00          
Growth rate of 
world  imports    0.0218  -0.2373  1.00         
Change in real 
exchange  rate    0.1004  0.241  -0.7115  1.00        
Change in raw 
material prices   0.0604  -0.1934  0.3447  -0.3028  1.00           
Short-term 
interest rate   0.185  -0.0319  0.013  0.0469  0.2413  1.00         
Inflation   0.0692  0.0467    0.2075  0.2064  0.7664  1.00       
Mean firm level 
growth in real 
sales  0.7958  0.5927 0.2383  -0.1727  0.415 0.0562 0.0353  1.00     
Mean firm level 
growth in assets  0.7329  0.6261 0.3318  -0.2735 0.2887  -0.1098  -0.1615 0.8729  1.00   
Mean inventory-
sales ratio  0.1043  0.0448 0.0551  -0.2241 0.0427 0.6296  0.511 0.0767  -0.0178  1.00 
Mean leverage  -0.0629  0.0179  0.2551  -0.0115  -0.189 -0.101  -0.4194  -0.2212  -0.0147 -0.1517 
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Table 2c: Descriptive Statistics: Partial R² 
 Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Domestic 
absorption  56,179 0.054  0.069  0.00  0.453 
World imports  56,179  0.057  0.074  0.00  0.519 
Real exchange 
rate  56,179 0.076  0.094  0.00  0.595 
Raw material 
prices  56,179 0.053  0.073  0.00  0.579 
Short-term 
interest rate  56,179 0.048  0.066  0.00  0.549 
Inflation 56,179  0.061  0.079  0.00  0.507 
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Table 3: Firm Level Response to Macroeconomic Factors 
Panel (a) reports results of cross-section regressions using the first-stage coefficient estimates as the 
dependent variable. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the first-stage regression standard errors. 
Panel (b) reports results of regressions of the partial R²s of the observed macroeconomic factors. The 
sectors not captured by the sector dummies are agriculture, energy, and mining. Panel (c) provides the 
descriptive statistics for these R²s. All regressions include a full set of legal fixed effects (unreported). 
The explanatory variables are 0-1-dummy variables. Residuals are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. ***, 
**, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
(a) Dependent variable: Coefficient estimates 












interest rate  Inflation 
Large (0/1)  0.233*  0.055** 0.105** 0.018** 0.220**  -0.302*
 (1.67)  (2.45) (2.06) (2.26) (2.23)  (1.89)
Listed (0/1)  0.421  -0.004 -0.111 0.012 0.629*  -0.828
 (0.84)  (0.04) (0.51) (0.30) (1.73)  (1.23)
Manufacturing (0/1)  -0.277  0.105** -0.005 -0.037* -0.639***  1.235***
 (0.77)  (2.55) (0.04) (1.88) (2.91)  (4.62)
Services (0/1)  -0.569  0.029 0.029 -0.071*** -0.520**  0.856***
 (1.50)  (0.64) (0.21) (3.39) (2.24)  (2.92)
Construction (0/1)  1.048  0.195* 0.029 -0.034 -1.303***  3.016***
 (1.41)  (1.84) (0.12) (0.79) (2.88)  (4.15)
Constant -0.075  -0.095 -0.045 0.023 0.071  -0.212
 (0.13)  (0.86) (0.19) (0.52) (0.18)  (0.31)
Observations 1,446  1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446  1,446
R-squared 0.02  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02  0.03
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interest rate  Inflation 
Large (0/1)  -0.002  -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.003  0.007**
 (0.43)  (1.21) (0.58) (1.52) (0.78)  (1.97)
Listed (0/1)  -0.01  -0.004 0.011 0.007 -0.024  -0.01
 (0.44)  (0.26) (0.57) (0.53) (1.43)  (0.58)
Manufacturing (0/1)  -0.018*  0.025*** -0.006 -0.003 -0.006  0.022***
 (1.93)  (4.12) (0.46) (0.23) (0.78)  (3.74)
Services (0/1)  -0.012  0.027*** 0.008 -0.004 -0.011  0.017***
 (1.29)  (4.18) (0.52) (0.27) (1.31)  (2.74)
Construction (0/1)  -0.028**  0.009 -0.037** -0.021 -0.021**  0.020**
 (2.55)  (0.84) (2.20) (1.25) (2.28)  (2.15)
Constant 0.073***  0.036** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.070***  0.037**
 (2.98)  (2.50) (2.73) (2.70) (3.97)  (2.31)
Observations 1,446  1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446  1,446
R-squared 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01
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Table 4: Determinants of Firm level Volatility of Real Sales 
This table reports results of panel fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the squared residual 
of a regression of firm level real sales growth on macroeconomic factors. Asset growth, the inventory-
sales ratio, and leverage are residuals of first-stage regressions as well. “Year” is a linear time trend, 
“Unification” dummy is a dummy variable which is set to “One” for the years 1991-1995 and “Zero” 
otherwise. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 





facturing Services Listed Unlisted  Small  Large 
Asset growth  0.036***  0.028*** 0.045*** 0.110*** 0.028*** 0.027***  0.048***
 (6.01)  (3.32) (5.16) (2.66) (5.70) (4.28)  (4.34)
Asset growth (t-1)  0.016***  0.014*** 0.011*** 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.012***  0.021***
 (4.82)  (3.03) (2.78) (2.70) (4.08) (3.45)  (3.47)
Asset growth (t-2)  0.002  0.002 0.003 0.024 0.00 0.002  0.001
 (0.62)  (0.36) (1.02) (1.37) (0.16) (0.86)  (0.22)
Asset growth (t-3)  -0.002  -0.004 0.004 0.00 -0.002 -0.003  -0.002
 (0.99)  (1.17) (1.45) (0.03) (1.25) (0.94)  (0.56)
Inventory-sales ratio  -0.073***  -0.061** -0.072*** -0.062 -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.076**
 (3.76)  (1.98) (3.34) (1.30) (3.54) (3.90)  (2.42)
Leverage  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
 (0.74)  (0.54) (0.34) (0.41) (0.48) (0.78)  (0.17)
Unification  0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.003* 0.001 0.00 0.00
 (0.31)  (0.11) (0.08) (1.79) (0.78) (0.10)  (0.29)
Year 0.000**  0.00 0.00 0.000** 0.00 0.00  0.000**
 (2.05)  (1.12) (1.15) (2.46) (1.20) (0.55)  (1.96)
Constant -0.142**  -0.032 -0.109 -0.673** -0.067 0.015 -0.145
 (2.13)  (0.43) (1.11) (2.59) (1.06) (0.20)  (1.34)
Sector dummies  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes
Legal dummies  yes  yes yes yes yes yes  yes
Year dummies  no  no no no no no  no
Observations 43,799  25,291 15,550 4,857 38,942 21,930 21,869
Number of cross-sections  1,464  884 579 212 1337 731  733
R-squared 0.02  0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02  0.02
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(b) Sample splits by time 
 1970s  1980s  1990s  2000s  Pre-1985  Post-1985 
Asset growth  0.001 0.033*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.018**  0.045***
 (0.08) (2.77) (4.35) (4.07) (2.15)  (5.74)
Asset growth (t-1)  0.012 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.009* 0.025***  0.014***
 (1.39) (3.76) (2.69) (1.80) (3.78)  (3.73)
Asset growth (t-2)  0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002
 (0.25) (0.43) (0.76) (1.00) (0.84)  (0.67)
Asset growth (t-3)  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.00 -0.004  -0.001
 (0.46) (0.31) (0.37) (0.06) (0.91)  (0.45)
Inventory-sales ratio  -0.002 -0.085** -0.125 -0.048 -0.089** -0.080*
 (0.09) (2.21) (1.63) (0.85) (2.05)  (1.88)
Leverage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
 (0.30) (0.51) (0.21) (1.54) (0.37)  (0.47)
Unification 0.005***   0.00
 (3.80)   (0.34)
Year 0.001*** 0.00 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***  0.00
 (3.79) (0.30) (4.15) (2.12) (3.13)  (1.28)
Constant -2.002*** -0.102 -1.710*** -1.122** -1.135*** -0.128
 (3.73) (0.29) (4.15) (2.01) (3.11)  (1.18)
Sector dummies  yes yes yes yes yes  yes
Legal dummies  yes yes yes yes yes  yes
Year dummies  no no no no no  no
Observations 7,088 14,245 14,097 8,369 14,221  29,578
Number of cross-sections  1,459 1,461 1,461 1,453 1,462  1,464




Table 5: Regression Results Heteroskedastic Regression Model 
This table reports results of the heteroskedastic regression model proposed by Harvey (1976). The 
dependent variable is the mean firm level volatility of sales for firms in each sector. Year is a linear time 
trend, Unification dummy is a dummy variable which is set to “One” for the years 1991-1995 and “Zero” 
otherwise. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
  (1)  (2) 
Mean equation    
Asset growth (t) 0.32*** 
(51.24)   
Asset growth (t–1) 0.09*** 
(18.55)  
Asset growth (t–2) –0.02*** 
(–3.53)  
Listed (0/1)  –0.0004 
(–0.26)   




Large (0/1)  0.001 
(1.22)   
Manufacturing (0/1)  –0.001 
(–0.57)  
Services (0/1)  –0.001 
(–0.39)  










Variance equation     




















Leverage    
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Graph 1: Unconditional Firm level Versus Aggregated Volatility 
Unconditional firm level output volatility is the median volatility of firm level sales growth over a five-
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Graph 2: Conditional Versus Unconditional Firm Level Volatility  
Unconditional firm level output volatility is the median volatility of firm level sales growth over a five-
year window. Conditional firm level output volatility is the corresponding volatility of the residual sales 
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